EU Enlargement as Security Policy: The Case of North Macedonia
- 1 hour ago
- 8 min read
By Landen Satterfield | February 2026
North Macedonia's stalled European Union accession is more than a regional dispute; it tests whether the post–Cold War security order, anchored in international law and shared institutions, can still deliver stability in Europe's most fragile neighborhood.
Despite meeting the formal benchmarks, North Macedonia remains outside the EU's doors. That delay is rooted in disputes over identity and historical narratives imposed by neighboring states, undermining its democratic trajectory, economic prospects, and security objectives that the international community has championed since the Balkan wars of the 1990s.
The European project emerged from the Second World War with a clear purpose: to bind former adversaries through economic integration and shared institutions so conflict would become unthinkable. Similarly, after the Cold War, EU enlargement served a stabilizing role by anchoring new democracies to rules-based governance and security provision. In this way, enlargement has functioned as a security mechanism as much as an economic project. For countries like Poland and the Baltic states, accession meant security guarantees that helped stabilize Central and Eastern Europe after the Soviet withdrawal.
Since gaining independence in 1991, North Macedonia has aspired to do the same, yet its progress has been obstructed despite significant reform. Even after agreeing to the Prespa Agreement in 2018, renaming the country from "Macedonia" to "North Macedonia," new conditions followed. Currently, objections from Bulgaria over Macedonian history, identity and language have imposed additional hurdles, and with each hurdle presented as the final one by local leaders, the situation has led the public to see no light at the end.
These disputes are not merely academic. They have become preconditions for accession. Because EU enlargement can be blocked by a single member state, neighboring countries such as Bulgaria and Greece hold disproportionate power over North Macedonia's future. An endless cycle of demands rooted in contested history and identity has left many young people with little hope of ever joining the Union. What was presented as a final hurdle, the Prespa Agreement resolving the name dispute with Greece, was meant to unlock accession. Instead, it morphed into a blueprint for the next set of demands, this time from Bulgaria by conditioning EU progression on how North Macedonia defines its language, history, and identity, member states have blurred the line between legitimate bilateral concerns and identity denial, wherein a sovereign state's self-determination is treated as negotiable. This approach diminishes faith in the principles the EU and U.S. claim to uphold: sovereignty, minority rights, and the rule of law.
The security implications extend well beyond North Macedonia's borders. A core rationale for integrating the Western Balkans into the EU and NATO was to lock in peace after the brutal conflicts of the 1990s, which killed nearly 140,000people. When accession becomes prolonged and unpredictable, it fuels frustration, nationalist rhetoric, and democratic erosion, conditions that invite external influence and destabilization. For the United States, which has invested billions in Balkan security since the 1990s through USAID, NATO enlargement, and support for democratic governance, stalled accession signals a failure to uphold international norms. These effects are not hypothetical. When Western institutions lose credibility, other powers can step in with alternative models that reject Western values and rules-based order.
Economically, EU membership represents a lifeline for Macedonia. Access to the single market, structural funds, and eventually the eurozone would expand investment and opportunity for a workforce increasingly on the move. Brain drain is already a pressing concern; many young Macedonians, including peers I have met in Skopje, see limited prospects in a country with a youth unemployment rate of 30.33% as of 2024, even if EU membership eventually occurs.
Remaining outside these structures suppresses investment and wage growth, forcing a brutal choice: wait for opportunities that may never arrive, or leave now. This demographic shift is a serious domestic challenge, but it also affects regional human capital and resilience. The loss of educated youth undermines civic engagement, weakens democratic checks, and narrows the pool of future leaders committed to European norms.
International law and security are intertwined in this context. The EU's Copenhagen criteria combine democratic standards, legal reforms, and respect for human rights. When accession negotiations become avenues for bilateral historical disputes rather than objective assessments of these criteria, the rule of law itself is weakened. This has implications for broader global governance, where the enforcement of legal norms already faces challenges from multipolar competition. As emergent powers contest the liberal order, the success or failure of institutions like the EU to integrate new members on predictable, fair terms sends strategic signals about the viability of the international rule-based system.
Why This Matters for Washington
The question naturally arises: why should the United States prioritize North Macedonia's EU accession when American strategic attention and foreign policy priorities have shifted elsewhere, particularly toward great-power competition with China and managing emerging challenges in the Indo-Pacific? The answer lies not in the Balkans' strategic weight per se, but in what failure there represents for American credibility and the international order Washington seeks to maintain globally.
The United States faces a fundamental challenge at present and for the next decade:: demonstrating that its model of international engagement, built on alliances, institutions, and rules-based order, can deliver tangible results in an era of renewed authoritarian assertiveness. When the EU, America's closest institutional partner, cannot execute a straightforward accession process for a country that has met technical requirements and made extraordinary concessions, it sends a damaging signal far beyond the Balkans. Beijing and Moscow are watching not just whether North Macedonia joins the EU, but whether Western institutions can function coherently at all.
This matters because American influence increasingly depends on proving that its partnerships offer practical benefits. In Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, governments weighing alignment choices look at whether Western engagement delivers stability and prosperity or merely rhetorical commitments. A Western Balkans where EU accession has become a theatrical exercise in indefinite delay, despite billions in American and European investment, becomes exhibit A for authoritarian powers arguing that liberal institutions are sclerotic, hypocritical, and ultimately unreliable.
The broader pattern is unmistakable. China offers infrastructure investment through the Belt and Road Initiative with few governance conditions. Russia provides security partnerships without democratic prerequisites. If the EU's most promising enlargement candidate, a country that changed its name, reformed its institutions, and anchored itself firmly to NATO, still cannot gain admission, why should aspiring democracies elsewhere trust the Western development model?
This credibility problem compounds at a moment when the United States is asking European allies to shoulder more responsibility for regional security as Washington reorients toward Asia. The bargain implicit in American strategic repositioning is that Europe will manage its own periphery. Yet the Western Balkans' dysfunction suggests Europe cannot or will not do so effectively, creating a vacuum that draws Washington back in despite its other priorities. The alternative, accepting that a region where America fought wars in the 1990s slides back toward instability, carries costs that would ultimately exceed the modest diplomatic capital required to push EU reform forward.
For Washington, the stakes are thus higher than North Macedonia's 2 million citizens might suggest. This is about whether the post-Cold War architecture of European security, built at significant American expense, can still expand and integrate new members. It is about whether rules-based institutions remain credible mechanisms for managing international relations. And it is about whether American partnerships can demonstrate real-world effectiveness at a moment when authoritarian alternatives are actively competing for influence.
What Washington Should Do
Given these stakes, the United States should pursue a three-pronged approach that leverages its unique position as both North Macedonia's NATO ally and the EU's indispensable security partner.
First, Washington must make North Macedonia's EU accession a consistent, high-level transatlantic priority. This means elevating the issue in bilateral discussions with EU member states, particularly with Bulgaria and Greece, framing it not as Balkan special pleading but as a test case for Western institutional credibility. The United States should use NATO forums, EU-U.S. summits, and bilateral dialogues to emphasize that prolonged accession delays undermine the broader transatlantic security architecture that underpins American commitments to European defense. The Secretary of State and senior officials should publicly articulate that North Macedonia's membership is a strategic interest, not merely a regional concern. This sustained diplomatic pressure, coordinated with like-minded EU members such as Germany and the Nordic states, can shift the political calculus in Brussels and Sofia.
Second, the U.S. should work with the European Commission to establish objective, time-bound mechanisms that insulate accession progress from bilateral disputes. One model would be an independent monitoring commission, backed by both the U.S. and EU, that certifies when a candidate country has met technical criteria, thereby limiting individual member states' ability to impose additional political conditions. Washington could offer technical assistance and funding for such mechanisms, positioning them as institutional innovations that strengthen the EU's capacity for strategic decision-making. This approach acknowledges European sovereignty over enlargement decisions while creating accountability structures that prevent indefinite obstruction.
Third, the United States should dramatically increase direct bilateral engagement with North Macedonia to demonstrate that alignment with Western institutions delivers concrete benefits, regardless of EU accession timelines. This means expanding trade and investment ties, providing additional security assistance, and creating exchange programs, particularly for young professionals, that reduce brain drain by offering opportunities without requiring emigration. US aid programs should expand programming focused on democratic resilience, judicial independence, and civil society, ensuring that reform momentum continues even as EU accession stalls. These measures serve dual purposes: they reinforce North Macedonia's Western orientation while creating visible alternatives to the narrative that only EU membership matters.
None of these recommendations will be universally popular. Pressing EU member states on their internal decision-making processes risks friction with allies already sensitive about American overreach. Investing additional resources in a small Balkan country will face skepticism from those who question why the U.S. should care about Europe's neighborhood when Asia demands attention. And creating bilateral alternatives to EU membership might inadvertently reduce pressure on Brussels to act.
Yet the alternative, allowing North Macedonia's accession to languish indefinitely, carries greater long-term costs. It would validate authoritarian critiques of Western institutions, encourage democratic backsliding throughout the Balkans, and signal American acquiescence to the erosion of the post-Cold War settlement in Europe. For an investment that is modest in absolute terms but significant in its demonstration effects, the United States should treat North Macedonia's EU future as what it is: a test of whether the Western international order can still expand, integrate, and deliver on its promises. Passing that test matters not just for the Balkans, but for every region where America seeks to prove that its model of international engagement remains viable in an age of strategic competition.
© 2025 The Council on International Law, Order, and Security (CILOS) and Justice Call. All rights reserved. This publication is the product of a joint research collaboration between Justice Call and CILOS. Both organizations are committed to amplifying diverse voices and advancing inclusive, rights-based approaches to global peace, justice, and international law. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without prior written permission from Justice Call and CILOS.
To cite this article, use the following reference: Emam, K. (2025). Reimagining the new global order in the times of uncertainty. Council on International Law, Order, and Security (CILOS) and Justice Call.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of Justice Call, CILOS, their staff, or board members.