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OPINION

Israel-Hamas Conflict: Lessons from Afghanistan

What twenty years of missed openings in Afghanistan suggest about the war in Gaza

Omer Niazi

November 23, 2023

Smoke rises over a residential district in Gaza. (Image via The National Interest Magazine)

OMER NIAZI is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Council and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center.

Smoke rises over a residential district in Gaza. (Image via The National Interest Magazine)

In the present landscape of Middle Eastern geopolitics, the Israel-Hamas conflict stands as a volatile fuse. If mishandled, it threatens to spark a more expansive regional conflagration. The lessons from Afghanistan remain a stark reminder of the repercussions of post-9/11 interventions that lacked a clear endgame strategy, eventually spiraling into a conflict spanning two decades.


The current posture toward the Israel-Hamas conflict appears heavily tilted toward military measures. If recent history teaches us anything, including the Afghanistan aftermath, it’s that military solutions without long-term political strategy often offer temporary relief at best, leaving deep-seated issues unresolved.


For over two decades, the U.S. policy apparatus resisted recognizing the necessity of a negotiated settlement to end the Afghanistan war—a conflict that resulted in nearly 176,000 casualties. In the aftermath of 9/11 and during the early stages of the conflict with the Taliban, the United States and its allies sidestepped diplomatic engagements, opting instead for a predominantly military strategy despite calls by policymakers in DC acknowledging that there was no military solution to the war. Senior State Department officials advocated for diplomacy and negotiation with the Taliban to President George W. Bush as the United States’ initial response to 9/11. The United States chose to declare war.


A decade later, conflicting parties entered into a stage of stalemate that might have encouraged yet another opportunity for a negotiated settlement. Still, the United States disregarded the potential for a peaceful settlement and continued to pursue military victory over the Taliban. By 2018, when the United States finally prioritized negotiations toward a political settlement, the clock had already run out. Two decades of conflict had driven the parties to such distant poles that neither side could muster the requisite trust or willingness to compromise necessary to achieve a political settlement.


The absence of a long-term political strategy to guide U.S. military strategy, combined with its inability to pursue a path of diplomacy and negotiation early on, fueled the Afghan conflict. A widely held public opinion summarizes it all—it took four U.S. presidents, thousands of lives, trillions of dollars, and twenty years to replace the Taliban with the Taliban.


Read full article at The National Interest →

Disclosure: This article was originally published by The National Interest and was written in the author's personal capacity, prior to the founding of the Council on International Law, Order, and Security. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Council, its staff, or its board.

To cite this article: Niazi, Omer. (2023, November 27). Israel-Hamas Conflict: Lessons from Afghanistan. The National Interest.

Copyright in this article is retained by the author. Published by the Council on International Law, Order, and Security. Quotation with attribution is welcome; republication in full requires permission. See our Terms of Use.​

​The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the Council, its staff, or its Board of Advisors.

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